Banking competition and risk-taking when borrowers care about financial prudence : [Version: Mai 2009] by Doluca, Hasan et al.
 
 
 
 
 
HASAN DOLUCA 
ROMAN INDERST 
UFUK OTAG 
 
 
 
 
 
Banking Competition and Risk-Taking When Borrowers 
Care about Financial Prudence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 28 (2009)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROF. DR. HELMUT SIEKMANN (HRSG.) 
 
INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
PROFESSUR FÜR GELD-, WÄHRUNGS- UND NOTENBANKRECHT 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
GRÜNEBURGPLATZ 1 
60629 FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
TELEFON: (069) 798 – 34014 
TELEFAX: (069) 798 – 33913 
E-MAIL:  GELD-UND-WAEHRUNG@IMFS-FRANKFURT.DE  
 
 
 
 
 
HASAN DOLUCA 
ROMAN INDERST 
UFUK OTAG 
 
 
 
 
Banking Competition and Risk-Taking When Borrowers 
Care about Financial Prudence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 28 (2009) Bank Competition and Risk-Taking When Borrowers
Care about Financial Prudence
Hasan Doluca∗ Roman Inderst† Ufuk Otag‡
First complete version August 2008; This version Mai 2009
Abstract
Corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank’s operations as
their continued access to credit may rely on the bank’s ability to roll over loans or to
expand existing credit facilities. As we show, a key implication of this observation
is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on
banks’ incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more
risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent. Our results oﬀer new
guidance for bank supervision in an increasingly competitive environment and may
help to explain existing, ambiguous ﬁndings on the relationship between competition
and risk-taking in banking. Furthermore, our results stress the beneﬁcial role that
competition can have for ﬁnancial stability as it turns a bank’s "prudence" into an
important competitive advantage.
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†University of Frankfurt, IMFS, and Imperial College London. E-mail: inderst@ﬁnance.uni-
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Over the last decades, in many countries the banking industry has become increasingly
deregulated. This and the spread of ﬁnancial innovations has widened the options that
are available to commercial borrowers, leading to more intense competition among banks
as well as between banks and alternative sources of ﬁnance.1 Borrowers are, however, well
advised to look further ahead when tapping into cheaper sources of (short-term) ﬁnance:
Will they later be able to reﬁnance a maturing loan and at what conditions? Will the
existing lender roll over the loan, extend a credit facility, or provide additional ﬁnance at
short notice? In particular for businesses that are less mature, smaller, or more opaque to
investors, it could become quite costly (or even impossible) to replace an existing lending
relationship at short notice, given that in this case the underlying relationship capital
would be lost.2
Empirically, this is documented, for instance, in Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993),
who found that borrowers from Continental Illinois suﬀered an average 4.2% loss in their
stock market value after the bank failed. Likewise, Djankov, Jindra, and Klapper (2005)
show that bank closures in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand decreased borrowers’ stock
prices by 3.9%, while Yamori and Murakami (1999) document a 6.6% decrease for those
borrowers who named the failed Japanese bank, Hokkaido Takusyoku, as their main lender.
W h i l eo u t r i g h tb a n k r u p t c yi sa ne x t r e m ee v e n t ,b o r r o w e r sm a ya l s ob ea d v e r s e l ya f -
fected if liquidity problems force their main lender to call back loans or to refuse the
expansion of existing credit facilities. To the extent that an existing relationship involves
some degree of “lock-in”, e.g., due to an informational advantage of an existing lender, the
borrower may not receive adequate funding elsewhere.
Based on these observations, this paper starts from the presumption that the riskiness
of a bank’s existing operations, as well as its leverage, represent a key quality attribute
in the eyes of potential borrowers. Banks that are perceived as being less aggressive in
undertaking (on- and oﬀ balance sheet) risk would then be regarded by borrowers as a
superior choice. As we show, this can play an important role in making banks more
conservative. In fact, unless they are levered up suﬃciently, e.g., through their deposit-
1On the latter see, in particular, Boot and Thakor (2000). While this process has clearly lost momentum
in the present (as of spring 2009) ﬁnancial crisis, it remains to be seen whether or to what extent it will
be reverted after all.
2This is a key notion in the large literature on relationship lending (cf. Boot (2000)).
1taking activities, they may even choose to forego positive-NPV "gambles". The focus of
this paper is, however, on the interaction of risk-taking and changes in competition.
We ﬁnd that competition (e.g., through deregulation that limits the scope for horizontal
diﬀerentiation) has an asymmetric impact on banks’ risk-taking incentives. As competition
becomes more intense, it is likely that some banks become more prudent, while their rivals
undertake riskier strategies. In particular, if banks already diﬀer in the riskiness of their
existing operations, more competition induces less (additional) risk taking from an already
more prudent bank, while it has the opposite eﬀect on its already riskier rivals.
This ﬁnding may provide some guidance to bank supervision in an increasingly com-
petitive environment. Our results would support neither the view that supervision must
be uniformly stepped up as competition increases nor the view that competition uniformly
reduces the need for supervision. Instead, as competition for loans increases, supervisory
activity should become more focused on those banks that are already riskier, while over-
sight could be relaxed for institutions that are already more prudent (that is, provided
that the authority’s objective is indeed to identify and potentially limit (additional) risk
taking). Furthermore, we also show that unless they are levered up suﬃciently, banks
may even be too conservative if their perceived future liquidity represents a main compet-
itive variable. To obtain this result, the strategic interaction of banks in the market for
borrowers is important.3
As competition increases, we thus identify a tendency towards more “vertical diﬀeren-
tiation”, given that in our model banks’ commercial borrowers care about how much risk
banks take on through other operations.4 The asymmetry in risk-taking behavior that
this paper identiﬁes is also supported by recent evidence in Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel
(2006). Though there the reason for why some banks become "less risky" is exogenous,
as it depends on government guarantees, their ﬁnding that these guarantees “strongly
increase the risk-taking of the competitor banks” would be predicted by our model.
3Put diﬀerently, our result does not simply follow from the observation that banks may remain prudent
so as to take advantage of future proﬁt-making opportunities.
4This tendency may counteract the risk of “herding” that has been identiﬁed in other papers. For
instance, such herding may follow from the expectation that the regulator will more likely bail out indi-
vidual banks if more of them ﬁnd themselves in a crisis (cf. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) for such a
“too-many-to-fail” argument).
2Relation to the Literature. Our ﬁnding that competition may have an asymmetric
impact on banks’ willingness to take on more risk mirrors the ambiguous ﬁndings in the
empirical literature. In a recent study, Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2003) ﬁnd that diﬀerent
measures of competition, e.g., based on concentration or the degree of deregulation, pre-
dict diﬀerent relationships between competition and the stability of the banking industry.
Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) have shown that a more concentrated banking sector
may be associated with less stability (cf. also De Nicolo and Loukoivanova (2007)). This
contrasts with earlier work as well as, more recently, with the ﬁn d i n g so fJ i m é n e ze ta l .
(2007) for a large sample of Spanish banks (cf. also the references therein). Our results
suggest that competition can indeed have mixed implications, though we provide predic-
tions for which banks should be expected to engage in more risk taking and which banks
should not.
In terms of theory, most of the extant literature would assert a positive correlation
between competition and banks’ incentives to take on (more) risk. Following Keeley (1990),
one suggested channel works through a reduction in banks’ charter value.5 Perotti and
Suarez (2002), instead, ﬁnd by comparing a monopoly with a banking duopoly that in
the latter case banks are more prudent as either bank hopes to enjoy monopoly proﬁts by
being “the last bank standing”, once the other bank has failed.
It should also be noted that our paper focuses on banks’ incentives to take on risk.
Clearly, holding all else constant, a reduction in banks’ proﬁtability may also mechanically
imply a higher risk of becoming insolvent. Another channel through which competition
aﬀects banks’ riskiness without aﬀecting their own risk-taking incentives was identiﬁed in
Boyd and Nicolo (2005), where a lower interest rate induces less risk taking by borrowers,
which in turn makes loans and thus banks’ balance sheets less risky (cf. also more recently
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008) for an extension and qualiﬁcation of their results).
On the other hand, Caminal and Matutes (1997) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002) argue
that under more intense competition banks would monitor less, thereby increasing the
5This has been conﬁrmed and extended by a number of other papers using dynamic models, e.g., Suarez
(1994), Hellmann et al. (2000), or Repullo (2004), to name only a few.
3likelihood of bad loans.6
Our model departs from the established literature in a number of ways. First, the
mechanism that links competition to risk-taking in our model is novel. In fact, to our
knowledge the relevance of banks’ own riskiness for borrowers has been largely ignored
in the (theoretical) literature.7 Second, our implications are diﬀerent from those in the
extant literature, which would typically predict a symmetric response of all banks to
more competition.8 Finally, while some of the arguments in the extant literature apply
indiscriminately of whether there is more competition on the asset or liability side (say,
for borrowers or depositors), e.g., given that they hinge simply on banks’ lower overall
proﬁtability, our channel, which predicts an asymmetric change in risk-taking incentives,
works exclusively through more competition in the markets for loans.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model. In Section 3 we solve the baseline model and derive ﬁrst results,
albeit restricting attention to ex-ante symmetric banks. Section 5 analyzes the interaction
of risk taking and competition, while Section 6 explores the role of (higher) leverage.
Section 7 introduces ex-ante asymmetry to derive more implications. Section 8 compares
the market outcome to a benchmark of eﬃciency. We conclude in Section 9.
2 The Model
We consider competition between two banks, indexed by i =1 ,2.F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f
this paper we take each bank’s capital structure as given. For instance, as frequently
done in the banking literature, we may suppose that it is determined by a bank’s access
6In a similar vein, competition reduces the incentives to screen borrowers in Chan et al. (1986) or
leads to more risk-taking by eroding informational rents originating from relationship banking in Besanko
and Thakor (1993). See further Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) for models of imperfect competition
generating a positive relationship between competition and risk (as well as Carletti and Hartmann (2003)
for a recent survey).
7For an exception see Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000), which seeks to explain the number of
banking relationships that a ﬁrm entertains.
8The asymmetry is, however, shared with recent work by Boot and Marinˇ c (2006). There, banks diﬀer
in their ability to monitor loans but can undertake investments to raise their overall level of monitoring.
As competition becomes more intense, those banks that have a lower intrinsic ability to monitor expect
to obtain a lower market share, which given the lump-sum nature of any investment into their monitoring
capacity reduces their investment incentives. For banks with a higher intrinsic ability to monitor the
opposite prediction holds.
4to (cheap) deposit ﬁnance. We suppose that originally each bank has capital k>0, of
which some fraction was ﬁnanced by debt and deposits. What matters for a bank’s risk-
taking incentives is the total amount that the bank will have to repay to debtholders before
equityholders are paid oﬀ. We suppose that the bank is run in the interest of equityholders.
We let Di denote a bank’s total repayment obligations.
We will later allow banks to diﬀer in the riskiness of their existing business. For the
time being, however, we still abstract from this and take also banks’ capital structure as
exogenously given.
The game then unfolds from time t =1onwards, where banks can choose a potentially
risky activity. This could represent, for instance, proprietary trading, additional loan
commitments (e.g., as back-up ﬁnancing), guarantees, or other contingent obligations. For
simplicity, we stipulate that initially this activity, to which we refer to as activity A,d o e s
not require capital. Both banks have access to it. The outcome of this activity is known
to the bank at the end of period t =1and leads to payments in t =2 . With probability p
the bank will realize from activity A the payoﬀ z0 > 0, while with the residual probability
1 − p the payoﬀ z00 < 0 materializes. In other words, with probability 1 − p the bank will
have a net outﬂow of z00.
It is convenient to denote F := |z00 − z0| and f =: z0.T h i sa l l o w su st oa n a l y z ea c t i v i t y
A in terms of some “fee” f that the bank receives for the risk of having to pay out F with
probability 1−p.9 As we abstract from discounting and as all parties are risk neutral, the
net present value of activity A is thus
ηA := f − (1 − p)F.
We stipulate that whether a bank chooses the risky activity A or not is observable.10
This will prove to be an important information for corporate borrowers, for which banks
subsequently compete. For notational simplicity it is convenient to stipulate that it is still
in period t =1that banks compete in the loan market.
Competition. Crucially, our set-up for the loan market must allow to deal with various
degrees of competition in a tractable way. This is accomplished by using a standard model
9For the purpose of our analysis it will be inconsequential whether and to what extent the outcomes
of the two banks’ risky activities are correlated.
10Though our results extend to the case where this is only observed with some noise, the resulting
signaling game would heavily complicate the analysis.
5of horizontal diﬀerentiation, namely that of Hotelling competition. Here, diﬀerentiation
could capture the extent to which a bank’s more “local” customers are both able and willing
to choose a more distant competitor. The associated costs (both for lenders and borrowers)
could be inﬂuenced both by regulation and by changes in the lending technology.
To be precise, we stipulate that there is a single potential borrower whose preferences
regarding the choice between the two banks are ex-ante unknown.11 His preferences are
captured by a variable x that is uniformly distributed over x ∈ [0,1] such that when
borrowing from bank i =1 , the borrower will incur a disutility (measured in units of
money) of τx, while when borrowing from bank i =2the respective disutility will be
(1−x)τ. One standard (Hotelling) interpretation is in terms of “shoe leather” costs, with
x representing a measure of the distance between the bank’s and the borrower’s premises.12
The loan contract prescribes that the borrower obtains capital k, which is fully invested
into a long-term project. If the project is continued until its end, which is in t =3 ,t h e n
it pays oﬀ y with probability q and zero otherwise. The expected payoﬀ qy is supposed to
exceed k. If liquidated prematurely in period t =2 , however, the project’s payoﬀ is only
βy < k.
Loan Contract. The loan contract oﬀered by bank i prescribes a total repayment of Ri
comprising the principal k and interest kri if the project is continued until t =3 .I ft h e
project is terminated prematurely in t =2 , all of its liquidation value βy < k is seized
by the bank. Importantly, note that the loan contract is only short term, allowing the
bank to recall the loan in t =1 .13 The speciﬁcations of the loan contract deserve some
additional comments.
The fact that the contract is only short term is realistic. It is also easily endogenized
by appealing to agency problems, either of moral hazard or adverse selection, between the
borrower and the bank. For instance, we could imagine that the borrower can be of two
types ξ = l,h. The type is only privately known to the borrower originally, but revealed
11We could imagine that among a number of borrowers who are located at diﬀerent distances to each
bank only one may have ﬁnancing needs and that his identity is ex-ante not known.
12See, for instance, Degryse and Ongena (2005) for a recent empirical application or Degryse et al.
(2006) for a wider interpretation of this approach. Our results would also follow from a model using
a Salop circle, in which case increased competition could also arise from an increase in the number of
competitors that are distributed uniformly over the circle.
13For instance, this could be a short-term revolving loan facility or a revocable overdraft facility that is
drawn down fully in t =1 .
6to the bank in t =2 . Only a project of type ξ = h has a chance of realizing a payoﬀ y
in t =3 , namely with probability qh, while the respective probability of a type-l project
is ql =0 . In addition, borrowers realize (arbitrarily small but strictly positive) private
beneﬁts in case the project is ﬁnanced and continued until t =3 . Facing such a problem
of adverse selection, the bank would want to preserve the right to call back the loan in
t =1and, thereby, obtain at least the value of the seized assets βy. Otherwise, it would
risk attracting also type-l borrowers.14
Banks’ Capitalization. In our model, the bank may call back the loan early so as to
prevent its own insolvency. In fact, this will be the case if the bank previously undertook
the risky activity and if the underlying gamble resulted in an obligation to pay out F in
t =2 . (Note that we assume here also that βy ≥ F.) As calling back the loan is clearly
ineﬃcient given that qy > k > βy, one may ask why the bank does not either provide
for more capital up-front, namely at least (F − f)+k, or raise capital in t =2so as to
absorb the loss of F. Though these clearly represent feasible options, realistically both
would have drawbacks on their own.
First, if the ﬁrm raised more than capital k up-front, then this could give rise to (“free
cash-ﬂow”) agency problems between the bank and its investors.15 Formally, we could
imagine that the bank’s managers consume a fraction γ>0 of all funds that have not
been used up until t =2 .A s γ becomes suﬃciently large, it would not be optimal to
r a i s em o r et h a nk up-front. Raising additional capital F in t =2may also prove too
expensive as new investors may be at an informational disadvantage (“dilution problem”).
Formally, we may suppose that at the end of t =1the bank, possibly together with the
borrower, learns about some features of the investment project, e.g., as captured by some
type ξ = l,h. When the bank raises new capital on the back of its existing assets, a
bank with a (relatively) bad loan may also want to raise new capital even without having
immediate liquidity needs (cf. Stein (1998), Winton (2003)).16
14Strictly speaking, we would also need that the pool of type-l borrowers (i.e. of so-called fraudulent
applicants or “ﬂy-by-night operators”) is suﬃciently large.
15This or another reason for why bank capital is costly needs to be invoked also in other models where
banks are capital constrained at some interim stage, i.e., where banks did not keep suﬃciently large buﬀer
capital initially.
16A similar argument of adverse selection can be used to rule out the possibility that when having to
repay his loan early, the borrower can successfully turn to another investor.
7Comment: A Model of Banks. In our main analysis we set banks’ leverage suﬃciently
low such that this by itself does not generate additional risk-taking incentives, allowing us
to focus on the novel contribution of our model. We show subsequently that our equilibrium
characterization survives if leverage adds additional risk-taking incentives (albeit, as is well
known, expressions then quickly become unwieldy).
Still, we believe that our model and analysis is one that deals genuinely with risk-
taking in banking rather than, say, risk-taking in any non-ﬁnancial corporation. This is
t h ec a s ea st h e" k n o c k - o n "e ﬀect of the bank’s additional risky activity works through its
commercial lending operation, where potential borrowers care about the overall soundness
of the lender’s ﬁnancial position.17
3 Equilibrium
As noted previously, we ﬁrst derive results for the benchmark case where the level of
outstanding debt, including deposits, does not itself aﬀect banks’ risk-taking incentives.
Hence, for the moment we can thus presume that the bank operates to maximize total
ﬁrm value. Abstracting thereby from (more standard) risk-taking incentives that follow
from leverage, this allows to focus on the novel mechanism that is at work in our model.
As also noted above, in our baseline case banks have no other ongoing activities in
place. Consequently, the ﬁr s td e c i s i o ni sm a d ea tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft =1 , where banks
can choose whether to undertake the risky activity A. Subsequently, they compete for the
borrower by making oﬀers Ri.I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ep r o c e e db a c k w a r d sb yﬁrst solving for
the equilibrium in the loan market. Subsequently, we determine the equilibrium at the
initial stage, where the risky activity A can be undertaken.
3.1 Competition for Loans
Banks compete for the borrower at the end of period t =1 . For the moment, it is
convenient to denote more generally by pi the commonly known probability with which
17Having said this, the literature has also drawn attention to cases where other "stakeholders" such
as customers or employees should be concerned about a ﬁrm’s balance sheet, at least if there is some
(relationship-speciﬁc) lock-in. Arguably, in a relationship between a lender and a commercial borrower we
can rightly assume that the latter is suﬃciently sophisticated to learn from analysts whether the former is
relatively more or less in good shape compared to its peers. In addition, the risk imposed on the borrower
in case of a subsequent solvency problem of its main bank could be large (as, for instance, evidenced by
the ﬁndings that were discussed in the Introduction).
8bank i will be able to roll over the loan in t =1 . (In equilibrium, we will thus have that
pi ∈ {p,1}.)
A borrower who is located at x ∈ [0,1] and takes out a loan with bank i =1realizes
the expected payoﬀ
p1q(y − R1) − xτ. (1)
Note that (1) takes into account that the loan will be recalled with probability 1 − p1.I f
the loan is, instead, continued, then the borrower realizes with probability q the project’s
payoﬀ y minus the contractually stipulated repayment R1. Finally, the last term xτ > 0
in (1) captures the degree of banks’ horizontal diﬀerentiation.
In analogy to (1), the borrower’s expected payoﬀ when turning to bank i =2equals
p2q(y − R2) − (1 − x)τ. (2)
Comparing (1) with (2), the borrower is just indiﬀerent between the two oﬀers if x is equal
to some critical value b x given by18
b x =
1
2
+
p1q(y − R1) − p2q(y − R2)
2τ
. (3)
Note that b x is also the ex-ante probability with which, for given (pi,R i), bank i =1will
attract the borrower, while the respective ex-ante probability for bank i =2equals 1− b x.
Using b x, the expected proﬁto fb a n ki =1f r o mt h el o a nb u s i n e s si st h u sg i v e nb y
b x[p1qR1 +( 1− p1)βy − k]. (4)
As we so far assume that the bank’s own leverage does not aﬀect decision making, the
optimal choice of R1 maximizes (4). Likewise, the optimal choice of R2 for the rival bank
i =2maximizes
(1 − b x)[p2qR2 +( 1− p2)βy − k]. (5)
By assuming that
(1 − p)y(q − β) < 3τ (6)
holds, we can ensure for pi ∈ {p,1} that in equilibrium both banks attract the borrower
with positive probability as 0 < b x<1. From the respective ﬁrst-order conditions for (4)
and from (5) we have the following result.
18It should be noted that (3) only applies if it satisﬁes 0 ≤ b x ≤ 1, which in turn is the case if
|p1q(y − R1) − p2q(y − R2)| ≤ τ holds. Otherwise, we clearly have that either b x =0or b x =1 .B e -
low we will invoke a condition that ensures that the solution is indeed interior.
9Proposition 1 For a given risk proﬁle, as captured by the respective values of pi,b a n k s
oﬀer loans that stipulate a required repayment of
Ri =
1
qpi
∙
k + τ − yβ(1 − pi)+
y(pi − pj)(q − β)
3
¸
. (7)
Expression (7) is intuitive. Note ﬁrst that if neither bank engages in the risky activity
A such that p1 = p2 =1 , then this simpliﬁes to R1 = R2 = R with qR = k + τ.I n
other words, the expected total repayment, qR, is equal to the principal k plus a margin
that is equal to the measure of horizontal diﬀerentiation, τ. Suppose that both banks
choose the risky activity, such that p1 = p2 = p<1, in which case expression (7) becomes
qpR+ βy(1 − p)=k + τ.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ee x p e c t e dt o t a lr e p a y m e n t ,w h i c hn o wi n c l u d e s
the liquidation value βy in case the loan is recalled, is again equal to the principal k plus
τ. Finally, note that if one bank, say bank i =1 , chooses to take on additional risk while
bank i =2stays prudent, such that p1 = p<p 2 =1 , we have from (7) that R1 <R 2.
The more prudent bank will thus charge a higher interest rate. Still, it is straightforward
to show that the more prudent bank, namely i =2in this case, will attract the borrower
with a higher probability (b x<0.5). More formally, substituting the equilibrium loan rates
Ri from (7) into (3), we obtain that19
b x =
1
2
+
1
2τ
(p1 − p2)
1
3
(q − β)y. (8)
From Proposition 1 we next have the following result.
Proposition 2 For a given risk proﬁle, as captured by the respective values of pi,b a n k s ’
expected equilibrium proﬁts from making loans are given by
πi =
1
2τ
∙
τ +
y(q − β)(pi − pj)
3
¸2
. (9)
This result gives rise to the following immediate observations. Intuitively, both banks’
expected proﬁts from the loan market are higher the more they are horizontally diﬀer-
entiated (as captured by a larger value of τ). Moreover, a given bank’s expected proﬁts
increase in its own value pi and decrease in its competitor’s value pj. In other words: If
bank i is perceived by a potential borrower to be of “higher quality” as it will more likely
19Note that this also conﬁrms that (6) indeed ensures that in equilibrium both banks are active with
positive probability.
10roll over the initial loan, then this allows the respective bank to realize higher proﬁts; but
if the bank’s competitor is perceived to be of “higher quality”, then this reduces the proﬁts
of the former bank. It is useful to collect these results more formally.
Corollary 1 We have that dπi/dpi > 0 and dπi/dpj < 0. Moreover, the likelihood with
which bank i will make a loan in equilibrium is strictly increasing in pi and strictly de-
creasing in pj.
3.2 Risk-Taking Incentives
The expression for proﬁts in Proposition 2 is now instrumental to solve for the equilibrium
strategies at the beginning of period t =1 , where banks can choose whether to undertake
the risky activity. We ﬁrst derive a set of auxiliary comparative results, which all are
immediate from undertaking the respective diﬀerentiation of expression (9).
Lemma 1 Banks’ expected proﬁts from making loans, πi,s a t i s f y
d2πi
dp2
i
> 0 and
d2πi
dpidpj
< 0 for i 6= j.
It is worthwhile to discuss in more detail the comparative results of Lemma 1. We
already know that the higher pi, the higher are the proﬁts of bank i.F r o m
d2πi
dp2
i > 0 this
eﬀect is stronger if pi is already high. In words, when a bank becomes more attractive to
the borrower, this has a larger (positive) eﬀect on proﬁts if the bank is already regarded
as a relatively safe choice. From
d2πi
dpidpj < 0, on the other hand, the eﬀect on own proﬁts
is smaller if also the rival bank is regarded as being a safe choice (high pj).20 These
comparative results are not speciﬁc to the chosen Hotelling model but hold in most other
models of oligopolistic competition with vertical diﬀerentiation.21 They are also intuitive.
To see this, take ﬁrst the case of
d2πi
dp2
i > 0. Recall from Corollary 1 that in equilibrium
bank i is more likely to make a loan the higher is pi. For instance, for i =1a higher value
p1 will translate into a higher value of b x.I f n o w b x is already high, then the bank will
beneﬁt more if it can further raise Ri following a further increase in p1. In other words,
an increase in the bank’s perceived “quality”, as expressed by p1,i st h u sm o r ep r o ﬁtable
if the bank’s "market share" b x is already high, given that this allows the bank to earn a
20In the formal language of Industrial Organization, the respective choices of pi represent strategic
substitutes.
21For a technical discussion see Athey and Schmutzler (2001).
11higher margin (from a higher R1) on a larger volume of transactions (or, more precisely,
with a higher probability in our setting).
An analogous intuition applies to
d2πi
dpidpj < 0.A ni n c r e a s ei n ,s a y ,p2 pushes down the
threshold b x and, thereby, the "market share" of bank i =1 . By the previous arguments,
this makes an increase in p1 less proﬁtable. Moreover, there is now an additional eﬀect at
w o r k .A si si n t u i t i v e ,b a n k saggregate proﬁts in the loan market are lower as they compete
more on equal grounds, i.e., as their respective values pi are more similar. Further below
we will study in detail how these forces are aﬀected by the prevailing degree of competition.
4 Risk Taking in Equilibrium
At t =1 , a bank’s expected proﬁts when not undertaking the risky activity is given by
Πi = πi, where we have to substitute pi =1into expression (9) for πi. When undertaking
activity A,i n s t e a d ,e x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts equal
Πi = πi + ηA,( 1 0 )
where now pi = p and where ηA represents the expected payoﬀ from A.
Intuitively, if ηA is suﬃciently high, then both banks strictly prefer to undertake activity
A. On the other hand, it is equally intuitive that for low values of ηA,w h i c hc a na l s ob e
negative, neither bank will choose activity A. In both cases, banks stay symmetric.
In contrast, a key implication of Lemma 1 is that for intermediate values of ηA the
equilibrium involves an asymmetric choice: one bank becoming riskier and the other one
s t a y ss a f e .T h i sf o l l o w sa sf r o mL e m m a1r i s kt a k i n gb e c o m e sr e l a t i v e l ym o r ep r o ﬁtable
if the rival bank stays prudent, while if the rival bank is expected to undertake the risky
strategy, then the safe strategy of foregoing activity A becomes relatively more attractive.22
Proposition 3 Expressed in terms of the net present value ηA from the risky activity (A),
we have the following equilibrium outcome in t =1 : There exist two thresholds 0 <η 0
A <η 00
A
satisfying
22As is standard, we restrict consideration to pure-strategy equilibria. As the outcome in a mixed-
strategy equilibrium would also be asymmetric with positive probability, our insights extend, however,
also to this case. Note also that for brevity’s sake we do not comment separately on the (non-generic)
case where ηA takes on the value of either threshold in the proposition, in which case both symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria exist.
12η
0
A :=
τ
2
−
1
2τ
∙
τ −
y(q − β)(1 − p)
3
¸2
(11)
and
η
00
A :=
1
2τ
∙
τ +
y(q − β)(1 − p)
3
¸2
−
τ
2
, (12)
such that for ηA ≤ η0
A neither bank chooses the risky activity, for ηA ≥ η00
A both banks
choose the risky activity, and for η0
A ≤ ηA ≤ η00
A only one bank chooses the risky activity.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 is interesting in itself as it shows in a relatively simple model that oth-
erwise symmetric banks may end up choosing diﬀerent risk proﬁles for strategic reasons.
For bank supervision this makes it more diﬃcult to draw inferences on the state of the
whole banking system from observations (e.g., critical incidences or site visits) at a single
bank or at only few banks.
5 Risk Taking and Competition
Using Proposition 3, we can now proceed to the key comparative analysis on the impact of
competition. For this recall ﬁrst that the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation is lower and
competition is thus more intense as τ decreases. From diﬀerentiating the expressions for
η0
A and η00
A in (11) and (12) with respect to τ, we immediately obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 As competition increases, the threshold η0
A from Proposition 3 decreases,
while the threshold η00
A increases. With more intense competition it thus becomes less likely
that both banks either take on additional risk through activity A or stay prudent, while it
becomes more likely that only one bank chooses A.
Proposition 4 formalizes our assertion from the Introduction that more intense compe-
tition has an asymmetric eﬀect on risk-taking incentives. Under more intense competition
banks are more likely to become asymmetric in terms of the additional risk they take on,
as well as in terms of their oﬀers and market shares when competing for borrowers (cf.
Corollary 1).
Clearly, for very low and very high values of ηA a change of τ will not aﬀect the
respective symmetric equilibria. An observable shift occurs instead around the respective
13thresholds η0
A and η00
A, where a reduction of τ leads to a switch from a symmetric to
an asymmetric equilibrium. Depending on the attractiveness of the "gambling" strategy
A, more competition could thus indeed be associated both with more and with less risk
taking in the banking industry. This may help to explain some of the conﬂicting and
ambiguous empirical ﬁndings (cf. the Introduction). In the subsequent Sections we will
obtain additional results in case banks are already ex-ante asymmetric, thereby obtaining
sharper predictions on which bank will become more or less prudent.
Note ﬁnally that an intuitive expression of Proposition 4 is in terms of the interaction
of vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation. As horizontal diﬀerentiation is reduced, with-
out vertical diﬀerentiation banks’ proﬁts on the loan market erode even if they are both
(equally) attractive for a borrower. This reduces the incentives for a bank to still "play
prudent" if this is also the strategy of its rival. These observations provide further intuition
for the reduction of the lower threshold η0
A. On the other hand, if one bank is expected to
undertake the risky strategy, then following an increase in competition it becomes more
proﬁtable for its rival to diﬀerentiate itself by being instead more prudent. This provides
an intuition for the increase in the upper threshold η00
A.
6 Leverage
So far we abstracted from the impact of leverage on risk taking. This allowed to clearly
work out the new eﬀects that are at the focus of this paper. In addition, the present
analysis would also be justiﬁed if banks had suﬃciently low leverage. In view of the fact
that banks tend to have high leverage, however, it seems warranted to consider also the
case where leverage is suﬃciently high to possibly create additional risk-taking incentives.23
We show that this is indeed the case also in our model and that in this case the previous
characterization of the equilibrium survives.
In more standard models, where there is no additional activity to be undertaken, there
would only be three possible cash-ﬂow realizations for the bank:z e r o( i fal o a ni sm a d ea n d
is not repaid), k (if no loan is made), and R (if a loan is made and successfully repaid).
23We should note one caveat regarding our use of the term leverage in this context. In an asymmetric
equilibrium, banks’ expected proﬁts will diﬀer, implying that also the market value of their equity is
diﬀerent. Consequently, banks would then have diﬀerent leverage in terms of debt value to total ﬁrm
value (equity plus debt value). For simplicity we focus, however, on diﬀerences in banks’ outstanding
repayment obligations.
14Clearly, if k exceeds the bank’s repayment obligation, Di,t h e nal o a nw o u l db em a d e
indiscriminately. We abstract from this case by assuming that Di <k . In our setting,
additional cash-ﬂow states are possible as banks can also undertake activity A.I ft h i si s
undertaken but realizes a loss, the bank’s cash ﬂow equals βy+ f − F in case also a loan
was made and had to be subsequently recalled. If no loan was made, the bank realizes
either k + f or k + f − F, depending on the outcome of the "gamble" from strategy A,
provided this was undertaken. In equilibrium, if the commercial loan market is suﬃciently
important (in terms of proﬁts) compared to strategy A, the ordering of the bank’s possible
cash ﬂow realizations is then as follows
f<β y+ f − F<k+ f − F<k+ f<R+ f. (13)
Recall now from the Introduction that there may be two instances when the bank does
not roll over the loan or extend new credit facilities. This may simply be the outcome of
insolvency, or it may be necessary to prevent—in our case otherwise unavoidable—insolvency.
In what follows, we want to focus (also in the light of reducing case distinctions) on the
ﬁrst case. We thus assume that Di >β y+ f − F: The bank can not meet its repayment
obligations even if it recalls the loan to fulﬁll its contractual obligations under strategy
A.24 For brevity’s sake we also assume symmetry with Di = D.25
Proposition 5 Our characterization of equilibria continues to hold if banks’ repayment
obligations, Di = D>0,a ﬀect their risk-taking incentives. That is, both banks undertake
the risky activity if ηA ≥ η00
A, both banks stay prudent if ηA ≤ η0
A, and only one bank
undertakes the risky activity if η0
A ≤ ηA ≤ η00
A. Furthermore, competition decreases η0
A and
increases η00
A. In addition, as leverage increases, both thresholds decrease, making it overall
more likely that either bank undertakes the risky activity.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 5 also shows also that as leverage increases, banks become
more aggressive in the market for borrowers. They thus demand lower interest rates,
leading to lower values of R and thus lower proﬁts.
24Recall also that in this Section we want to focus, in contrast to the previous analysis, on the case of
relatively high leverage.
25We can extend Proposition 5 to the case of asymmetric levels of Di, albeit this comes with a consid-
erable extension of all involved expressions.
15There are two remaining cases that must be distinguished in the proof. The most
simple case is that where D<k+ f − F. Here, the bank fails either if its loan was not
repaid or if it undertook both activities, i.e., that of making a loan and strategy A, while
the "gamble" from strategy A was not successful. If both banks stay prudent (ηA ≤ η0
A)
equityholders realize in this case an expected payoﬀ (net of k)t h a ti sj u s te q u a lt oτ/2−D,
while if both "gamble" (ηA ≥ η00
A) their expected payoﬀ is τ/2 − D + ηA.26 Interestingly,
as the repayment obligation ("face value of debt") D increases, say by ∆D,t h ev a l u eo f
equityholders’ claims decreases by exactly the same amount, ∆D. While the increase in
the value of debt is strictly smaller than ∆D, given that it is risky, the resulting diﬀerence
is exactly made up by the reduction in each bank’s overall proﬁts, following a reduction of
the interest rate that is charged to borrowers, given that banks compete more aggressively.
The second remaining case is that where D>k+f −F. Here, the bank fails also if it
did not make a loan, but the gamble failed. If both banks stay prudent, then a marginal
increase in D does not aﬀect the outcome, such that equityholders still realize (net of k)
τ/2 − D. If both banks gamble, instead, then given the high probability with which debt
will not be repaid in full, the value of equity now decreases by less than ∆D (namely, by
only p∆D).
7 Heterogeneous Banks
We extend our analysis to the case where banks have already initially diﬀerent risk proﬁles.
For the purpose of our analysis we model this in a parsimonious way by stipulating that
even without undertaking the risky activity A,b a n ki will with probability 1−si have an
outﬂow of funds denoted by S in t =2 .( A g a i n ,si is thus a measure for the quality of a
bank in terms of its initial appeal to the borrower.) All that matters for our analysis is
that this outﬂow is not too large so that βy is still suﬃcient to cover S+F. For simplicity,
we further stipulate that both potential shocks to the bank’s capital are uncorrelated. If
bank i undertakes activity A, it will thus be able to roll over the loan only with probability
psi, while without strategy A this is the case with probability si.
26The expressions for payoﬀs in the asymmetric equilibrium are somewhat more complicated and con-
tained in the Appendix.
16Equilibrium Analysis. Turning ﬁrst to competition in the loan market, we work, as
previously, with a slightly more general notation: pi ∈ {p,1}. A borrower located at
x ∈ [0,1] now realizes the expected proﬁts
p1s1q(y − R1) − xτ
or
p2s2q(y − R2) − (1 − x)τ
when obtaining a loan from bank i =1or bank i =2 , respectively. The critical threshold
at which the borrower is just indiﬀerent becomes thus
ˆ x =
1
2
+
qp1s1 (y − R1) − qp2s2 (y − R2)
2τ
.
Proﬁts from competition on the loan market are then given by
ˆ x[p1s1qR1 +( 1− p1s1)βy − S (1 − s1) − k] (14)
for bank i =1 , while those for bank i =2equal
(1 − ˆ x)[p2s2qR2 +( 1− p2s2)βy − S (1 − s2) − k]. (15)
We conﬁne a derivation of the resulting equilibrium proﬁts to the proof of Proposition
6. To characterize banks’ incentives to undertake the risky activity A,w eh a v et oi n t r o d u c e
some additional notation in analogy to Proposition 3. For a given bank i,t h e r ee x i s tt w o
thresholds for the net present value ηA of activity A:F o rηA ≤ η0
Ai bank i would never want
to undertake the risky activity; for ηA ≥ η00
Ai bank i would always want to undertake the
risky activity; and for η0
Ai ≤ ηA ≤ η00
Ai bank i would remain prudent if its rival undertakes
the risky activity and would itself undertake the risky activity if its rival stays prudent
instead. Clearly, if banks are initially symmetric with s1 = s2, then the thresholds for
both banks are also symmetric: η0
A1 = η0
A2 = η0
A and η00
A1 = η00
A2 = η00
A. We are thus back
to the case analyzed in Proposition 3. If banks are, however, initially asymmetric, then
the respective thresholds are diﬀerent. In this case, we ﬁnd that the initially more risky
bank, say i =2when s1 >s 2,h a shigher incentives to take on additional risk. Formally,
both thresholds are then lower for bank i =2 : η0
A1 >η 0
A2 and η00
A1 >η 00
A2.( F o raf o r m a l
statement see the subsequent Proposition 6.)
17The intuition for this result follows immediately from our previous observations on the
properties of banks’ proﬁt functions πi (cf. Lemma 1). Recall, in particular, that πi is
convex in the probability with which bank i will be able to roll over the loan in t =2
(i.e., previously pi and now sipi). The higher is si, the higher are thus also the beneﬁts
from staying prudent by not undertaking activity A, i.e., from choosing pi =1instead of
pi = p<1.
The full characterization of all equilibria depends now on the size of the diﬀerence
s1 − s2 > 0. Intuitively, if this diﬀerence is suﬃciently large, then in an asymmetric
equilibrium, which in analogy to Proposition 3 applies for intermediary values of ηA,o n l y
the initially more risky bank i =2will take on additional risk. Otherwise, i.e., if s1−s2 >
0 remains small, then for intermediary values of ηA there will still be a multiplicity of
equilibria: Either bank i =1or bank i =2undertakes activity A, while the other bank
stays prudent.
Proposition 6 Suppose banks have already initially diﬀerent risk proﬁles with bank i =2
b e i n gm o r er i s k ya ss1 >s 2. Then banks’ incentives to take on additional risk in t =1are
given as follows:
i) If the diﬀerence in s1 − s2 > 0 is suﬃciently large, then η0
A1 >η 00
A2 holds. In this
case, for low net present value ηA of activity A (ηA <η 0
A2) neither bank undertakes A,f o r
high values of ηA (ηA >η 00
A1) both banks undertake A, while for intermediate values of ηA
(η0
A2 <η A <η 00
A1) only the initially more risky bank, i =1 ,u n d e r t a k e sA.
ii) If instead η0
A1 <η 00
A2 h o l d sa st h ed i ﬀerence s1 − s2 > 0 is relatively small, then the
only diﬀerence to case i) is that there now exists an interval η0
A1 <η A <η 00
A2 with multiple
asymmetric equilibria: Either one of the banks may undertake activity A,w h i l et h eo t h e r
bank does not.
Proof. See Appendix.
Competition and Risk Taking. Again, we are mainly interested in the implications
of an increase in competition, as captured by a lower value of τ.W e t a k e ﬁrst Case
i) of Proposition 6. We can show for the interval η0
A2 <η A <η 00
A1, where only bank
i =2undertakes the additional risky activity A, that more competition reduces the lower
boundary, η0
A2, and increases the upper boundary, η00
A1. (Formally, this follows immediately
18from diﬀerentiating the respective thresholds in the proof with respect to τ.) In this case,
we can thus unambiguously conclude that more intense competition makes it more likely
both that the initially more risky bank, i =2 , additionally undertakes the risky activity A
and that the initially less risky bank, i =1 , stays prudent.
Recall next that in Case ii) of Proposition 6 we still obtain multiple equilibria over
an intermediary interval of values ηA, though the size of this interval decreases as banks
become ex-ante more heterogeneous. If we then still choose the equilibrium where the
initially more risky bank undertakes activity A, then the comparative analysis in τ from
the previous Case i) still fully applies. For the comparative analysis in the following
Proposition we select this case for the following reason. Suppose instead that in Case ii)
and for η0
A1 <η A <η 00
A2 we would select the equilibrium where only the initially less risky
bank, i =1 , undertakes activity A. As we change ηA, our predictions for the risk-taking
incentives of both banks would then be non-monotonic in the following way: We would
p r e d i c tt h a tb a n ki =2stays prudent for very low as well as some intermediary values of
the net present value ηA, while it undertakes activity A for high as well as for some lower
range of values ηA.I n s t e a d ,i fw es e l e c ti nC a s ei i )a n df o rη0
A1 <η A <η 00
A2 the equilibrium
where the initially more risky bank also undertakes activity A, then for each bank the
predictions change monotonically in ηA: The respective bank will undertake activity A if
and only if ηA lies above a threshold value.
Proposition 7 Suppose banks have already initially diﬀerent risk proﬁles with bank i =2
b e i n gm o r er i s k ya ss1 >s 2. Then as competition increases, the initially more risky bank
i =2becomes more likely to undertake, in addition, the risky activity A,w h i l ei t si n i t i a l l y
less risky rival i =1is less likely to do so.
Proposition 7 would thus suggest the following policy implication. In order to identify
banks that are most likely to build up additional risk, supervisory authorities should dedi-
cate relatively more time and eﬀort on already more risky bank as competition intensiﬁes.
In contrast, they need to worry less about initially less risky banks, for which risk-taking
incentives decrease under more intense competition.
198E ﬃciency
Our discussion so far focused on making positive predictions. We thus did not analyze
whether the chosen strategies were also optimal from a social perspective.27 What compli-
cates the analysis of eﬃciency is the following observation. To compare total welfare, we
have to consider two diﬀerent sources of ineﬃciency that may arise from banks’ decision
to undertake activity A. First, this decision involves a trade-oﬀ between the present-value
from this activity (if positive) and the risk of early withdrawal of funds and thus ineﬃ-
cient liquidation. Second, if banks end up with asymmetric proﬁles, then there are also
ineﬃciencies in the loan market, given that the borrower may no longer obtain its loan
at the "closest" bank, which would be the case only if b x =1 /2. In what follows, we take
these two eﬀects into account in two steps. Furthermore, it proves to be helpful to discuss
the risk-taking incentives of the two banks in sequence, supposing ﬁrst that only one bank
considers to "gamble" and taking subsequently into account the incentives of the second
bank.
(Eﬃcient) Risk-taking Incentives of "First Bank" (i =1 ). Suppose one bank,
i =2 , is expected to stay prudent. If the other bank chooses strategy A, instead, then this
generates the net present value of ηA from the risky activity, while given early withdrawal
the eﬃciency from a newly made loan is decreased by (1 − p)y(q − β). The crux is now,
however, that by undertaking the risky activity, the bank’s likelihood of being successful
in the loan market will also be reduced. Precisely, starting from b x =1 /2 in the symmetric
case, we have from (8), where p1 = p and p2 =1 , that subsequently the likelihood of
making a loan (or "market share") is reduced to
b x =
1
2
−
1
2τ
(1 − p)
1
3
(q − β)y. (16)
We take this into account and focus ﬁrst, as noted above, solely on the beneﬁts and
costs generated by the risky activity of bank i =1 . Then, that bank i =1takes on the
additional risk is also eﬃcient if
ηA ≥ η
0
Eff := (1 − p)y(q − β)b x, (17)
27In this paper as well as in much of the literature that analyzes banks’ risk-taking incentives, we
abstract from other reasons why regulators may want to ensure a more prudent behavior of banks, e.g.,
the risk of contagion if one bank fails.
20where b x is given by (16). After some transformations we can show that η0
Eff >η 0
A holds
if and only if τ is suﬃciently large. In contrast, if competition is suﬃciently intense, such
that τ is relatively small, the opposite holds: η0
Eff <η 0
A.( C f .t h e p r o o f o f P r o p o s i t i o n
8). In words, if competition is suﬃciently relaxed, then the bank will choose "too early"
to gamble. Precisely, given η0
A <η 0
Eff this holds if η0
A <η A <η 0
Eff,i nw h i c hc a s et h e
expected ineﬃciency from possibly having to recall the loan still outweighs the created
value ηA. However, if competition is intense, then we can show that η0
A >η 0
Eff. Hence, for
values η0
Eff <η A <η 0
A bank i =1should undertake the risky activity when we compare
ηA with (1 − p)y(q − β)b x,b u ti tﬁnds it privately proﬁtable to stay prudent, instead.
The intuition behind this somewhat surprising result is the following. With intense
competition the more risky (and thus in the eyes of the potential borrower inferior) bank
will be at a substantial disadvantage, in terms of the equilibrium likelihood of making
al o a n . F o rl o wτ this makes bank i =1too conservative in terms of its incentives to
undertake A.
The preceding observations ignore, however, the additional welfare implications that
arise from the fact that with b x<1/2 there is a further loss in eﬃciency, given that a
borrower with x ∈ (b x,1/2) will incur higher “shoe leather” costs than in a symmetric
equilibrium. With less intense competition this reinforces the previous ﬁndings, given that
we already observed that bank i =1had too high incentives to take on activity A.T a k e
thus the case of more intense competition and η0
Eff <η 0
A. As we show in the proof of
Proposition 8, once we take into account all welfare implications, then regardless of the
intensity of competition we have for the newly deﬁned threshold e η
0
Eff that η0
A < e η
0
Eff.
That is, holding the "prudent" choice of bank i =2ﬁxed, bank i =1h a sa l w a y st o oh i g h
incentives to choose the risky strategy, once total welfare is taken into account.
(Eﬃcient) Risk-taking Incentives of "Second Bank" (i =2 ). Suppose now that
bank i =1is expected to undertake A.I fa l s ob a n ki =2undertakes the risky activity,
from a welfare perspective we again have to ﬁrst trade-oﬀ again the realization of ηA with
t h ef a c tt h a tt h el o a nm a yb ei n e ﬃciently recalled. Taking the threshold b x from (16), the
latter ineﬃciency is equal to 1−b x times (1−p)y(q−β).F r o mt h i sw eo b t a i nt h ec r i t e r i o n
ηA ≥ η
00
Eff := (1 − p)y(q − β)(1 − b x),
21where η00
Eff is clearly strictly higher than the threshold η0
Eff in (17). Moreover, we now ﬁnd
that η00
A <η 00
Eff always holds. That is, when only trading oﬀ ηA with the possibility of an
ineﬃcient termination of a loan, then the transition to a symmetric equilibrium where both
banks undertake the risky activity is always too “early”. However, when we consider total
welfare, i.e., again including the "shoe leather" costs of the borrower, then as competition
becomes suﬃciently relaxed, results are reversed: Bank i =2has insuﬃcient incentives to
take on additional risk.
Summary. The following Proposition summarizes results and provides a comparison
between the eﬃciency benchmark and the equilibrium outcome. For brevity we restrict
the statement of the Proposition to the full-welfare benchmark.
Proposition 8 Take as a benchmark that of total welfare, including the NPV of strat-
egy A,i n e ﬃciencies from early liquidation of a funded project, and possibly ineﬃciently
high ("shoe leather") costs in the market for borrowers. Then, there are two thresholds
e η
0
Eff < e η
00
Eff such that no bank should undertake the risky activity for ηA ≤ e η
0
Eff,b o t h
banks for ηA ≥ e η
00
Eff, and only one bank for e η
0
Eff ≤ ηA ≤ e η
00
Eff. These thresholds compare
with the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3 as follows:
i) It always holds that η0
A < e η
0
Eff:T h e" ﬁrst" bank that chooses the risky strategy will
always do so "too early", i.e., for values of ηA that are still too low from a welfare perspec-
tive.
ii) In contrast, η00
A < e η
00
Eff holds only if competition is not too intense (low τ), while other-
wise (high τ) it holds that η00
A > e η
00
Eff. It thus depends on competition whether for interim
values of ηA there is too much risk taking as both banks choose A, but should not, or too
little risk taking as both banks should choose A, but only one bank does so.
Proof. See Appendix.
A key observation from Proposition 8, as well as from our preceding discussion, is
that even in the absence of (additional) risk-taking incentives from leverage, banks may
not have ﬁrst-best incentives to take on risk. However, as our discussion and Proposition
8 reveal, risk-taking incentives can be too high or too low, depending on how a bank’s
concern for its reputation with potential corporate borrowers interacts with competition.
Here, in line with our preceding observations on risk-taking incentives, from Proposition
228 we obtain ambiguous results if competition becomes suﬃciently intense. In this case,
there may be either too much (namely, for low values of ηA) or too little (namely, for high
values of ηA) risk taking in the market.28
Admittedly, Proposition 8 does not generate clear-cut prescriptions for regulation and
supervision. Also, recall that our welfare analysis neglects any externalities that arise
from risk-taking and the resulting possible failure of a bank. Still, however, Proposition
8 and the preceding analysis point to the key beneﬁcial role that competition can play
to mitigate risk-taking incentives. In particular, when one bank is expected to engage in
additional risk taking, with intense competition a rival bank has much to gain when it stays
"prudent" and, thereby, enhances its attractiveness in the eyes of commercial borrowers.
This mechanism is, however, only at work when competition prevails.29
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes how a bank’s reputation with potential corporate borrowers interacts
w i t hi t si n c e n t i v e st ot a k eo n( a d d i t i o n a l )r i s k ,e.g., through proprietary trading, additional
loan commitments, guarantees, or other contingent obligations. Corporate borrowers, in
particular those who ﬁnd it diﬃcult to borrow from the market or from other lenders at
short notice, care about the bank’s overall ﬁnancial strength, as this will determine their
future access to credit. Banks that face a short-fall of proﬁts or that are hit by high
payment obligations will cease to roll over outstanding loans or they will call back existing
credit facilities.
We explore the model to investigate primarily the interaction between risk-taking in-
centives and competition. Though much ink has already been spilled on this topic (cf.
the Introduction for an account of the literature), a key distinctive feature of our analysis
is that it generates an asymmetric response of banks’ risk-taking incentives to competi-
tion. In particular, we found that banks that are already more riskier have an increasing
appetite to take on more risk as competition intensiﬁes, while their safer rivals are more
likely to stay prudent. As noted in the Introduction, this may shed further light on some
conﬂicting and ambiguous ﬁndings in the literature.
28That applies, more precisely, for values of ηA that are low but not too low, and values of ηA that are
high but not too high—as, otherwise, no bank or both banks would and should take on additional risk.
29In the present (as of spring 2009) ﬁnancial crisis it becomes, indeed, clear that banks diﬀer much in
the (additional) risks that they have engaged in, which now translates into key competitive diﬀerences.
23In addition, our ﬁndings provide some guidance for bank supervisors and regulators.
Supervisors’ response to increased competition should be asymmetric, by targeting already
riskier banks, while relaxing oversight of presently more prudent institutions (provided that
the objective is to identify and potentially limit (additional) risk taking). Furthermore,
regulators and supervisors should view competition not as being detrimental to ﬁnancial
stability. Instead, when banks’ risk positions are transparent to commercial borrowers, we
argue that competition may stiﬂe banks’ risk appetite, as it turns "prudence" into a key
competitive variable.
10 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Using (10), if both banks undertake activity A,t h e ne a c hb a n k
realizes the proﬁt ηA + τ
2. A deviating bank obtains, instead, the proﬁt
1
2τ
[τ +
(qy − βy)(1 − p)
3
]
2. (18)
C o m p a r i n gt h et w op r o ﬁt levels shows that we can support a symmetric equilibrium with
risk taking if and only if ηA ≥ η00
A, as characterized in (12). If both banks are prudent,
they realize proﬁts of τ
2. If one bank deviates and undertakes activity A instead, its proﬁt
equals
ηA +
1
2τ
∙
τ −
(qy − βy)(1 − p)
3
¸2
. (19)
C o m p a r i n gt h et w op r o ﬁt levels shows now that we can support a symmetric equilibrium
without risk taking if and only if ηA ≤ η0
A, as characterized in (11).
Turning ﬁnally to asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, note ﬁrst that the respective
proﬁts of the prudent and the gambling bank are then given by (18) and (19), respectively.
Comparing these proﬁts to the proﬁts τ
2 and ηA + τ
2 under a symmetric choice, i.e., if one
bank deviates, we obtain that the bank undertaking A will not deviate if ηA ≤ η0
A, while
the prudent bank will stay so only if ηA ≥ η00
A.O b s e r v eﬁnally that η00
A >η 0
A. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. Note ﬁrst that there are two cases to be distinguished: that
with βy − F + f<D<k+ f − F and that with k + f − F<D<k .
24The Case with βy − F + f<D<k+ f − F. Using (3) for ˆ x, the expected payoﬀ to
equityholders of bank i =1is given by
ˆ x(p1q(R1 + f1 − D1)) + (1 − ˆ x)(p1 (k + f1 − D1)+( 1− p1)(k + f1 − F − D1)), (20)
where p1 = p and f1 = f if the bank chooses activity A, while otherwise p1 =1and
f1 =0 .B a n ki =1chooses R1 to maximize (20). For bank i =2we obtain likewise for
equityholders’ payoﬀ
(1 − ˆ x)(p2q(R2 + f2 − D2)) + ˆ x(p2 (k + f2 − D2)+( 1− p2)(k + f2 − F − D2)). (21)
From the respective ﬁrst-order conditions for (20) and (21) we obtain after some transfor-
m a t i o n s( a n di nc a s eo fa ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nf o rˆ x)t h a t
Ripiq = τ + k − (D − fi)(1− qpi) − F (1 − pi)
+
(fj − fi)(1− qpi)+( pi − pj)(q(y − D)+qfj − F)
3
,
which after substitution into (20) and (21), respectively, yields the expected payoﬀ to
equityholders of bank i
fi − F (1 − pi) − D (22)
+
1
2τ
µ
τ +
(fj − fi)(1− qpj)+( pi − pj)(q(y − D) − F + qfi)
3
¶2
.
If both banks undertake activity A, then each bank’s equityholders’ payoﬀ is calculated
by inserting pi = pj = p and fi = fj = f into (22), yielding
τ
2
− D + ηA. (23)
A deviating bank’s equityholders’ payoﬀ is, instead, after substitution of pi =1 , pj = p,
fi =0 ,a n dfj = f,e q u a lt o
1
2τ
µ
τ +
pf (1 − q)+( 1− p)(q(y − D)+f − F)
3
¶2
− D. (24)
Comparing this to (23) shows that we can support a symmetric equilibrium with risk
taking if and only if
ηA ≥ b η
00
A :=
1
2τ
µ
τ +
pf (1 − q)+( 1− p)(q(y − D)+f − F)
3
¶2
−
τ
2
.
25If both banks are prudent (pi = pj =1and fi = fj =0 ), their equityholders’ payoﬀ
is τ
2 − D. If one bank deviates and undertakes activity A instead (pi = p,pj =1and
fi = f,fj =0 ), its equityholders’ payoﬀ equals
ηA − D +
1
2τ
µ
τ −
f (1 − q)+( 1− p)(q(y − D)+fq− F)
3
¶2
. (25)
Comparing the two payoﬀs shows now that we can support a symmetric equilibrium with-
out risk taking if and only if
ηA ≤ b η
0
A :=
τ
2
−
1
2τ
µ
τ −
(pf (1 − q)+( 1− p)(q(y − D)+f − F))
3
¶2
.
Turning to asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h ep a y o ﬀso ft h ee q -
uityholders of the prudent and the risk taking bank are then given by (24) and (25),
respectively. Comparing these to τ
2 − D and τ
2 − D + ηA under a symmetric choice, we
obtain an asymmetric equilibrium if b η
0
A ≤ ηA ≤ b η
00
A, where indeed b η
00
A > b η
0
A.
T h eC a s ew i t hk + f − F<D<k . If k + f − F<D<k , using (3) the expected
payoﬀ of the equityholders’ of bank i =1is given by
ˆ x(p1q(R1 + f1 − D)) + (1 − ˆ x)(p1 (k + f1 − D)). (26)
Likewise, the optimal choice of R2 for the rival bank i =2maximizes
(1 − ˆ x)(p2q(R2 + f2 − D)) + ˆ x(p2 (k + f2 − D)). (27)
From the respective ﬁrst-order conditions for (26) and (27) we have that
piqRi = τ + kpi − pi (1 − q)(D − fi) (28)
+
(pi − pj)(qy − k)+( 1− q)(pi (D − fi) − pj (D − fj))
3
.
26Using expressions (26) and (28), we can calculate equityholders’ equilibrium payoﬀs:
1
2τ
µ
τ +
(pi − pj)(qy − k)+( 1− q)(pi (D − fi) − pj (D − fj))
3
¶2
−(1 − pi)k−pi (D − fi).
(29)
If both banks undertake activity A, then each bank’s equityholders’ payoﬀ is calculated
by inserting pi = pj = p and fi = fj = f into (29), which yields
τ
2
+ ηA +( F − f)(1− p) − k(1 − p) − pD. (30)
In case of a deviation, such that pi =1 , pj = p, fi =0 ,a n dfj = f,w eh a v et h a t
1
2τ
µ
τ +
(1 − p)(qy − k)+( D(1 − p)+fp)(1− q)
3
¶2
− D. (31)
C o m p a r i n gt h et w op a y o ﬀs shows that we can support a symmetric equilibrium with risk
taking if and only if
ηA ≥ e η
00
A := (1 − p)(−F + f + k − D) −
τ
2
+
1
2τ
µ
τ +
pf (1 − q)+( 1− p)(D(1 − q)+qy − k)
3
¶2
.
If both banks are prudent (pi = pj =1and fi = fj =0 ), their equityholders’ payoﬀ is
τ
2 − D. If one bank deviates and undertakes activity A instead, such that pi = p, pj =1 ,
fi = f´ ,a n dfj =0 , its equityholders’ payoﬀ equals
1
2τ
µ
τ −
(1 − p)(qy − k)+( D(1 − p)+fp)(1− q)
3
¶2
− k(1 − p) − pD. (32)
Comparing the two payoﬀs shows now that we can support a symmetric equilibrium with-
out risk taking if and only if
ηA ≤ e η
0
A := (1 − p)(−F + f + k − D)+
τ
2
−
1
2τ
µ
τ −
pf (1 − q)+( 1− p)(D(1 − q)+qy − k)
3
¶2
.
27Turning to asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, note ﬁrst that the payoﬀs of the equity-
holders’ of the prudent and the gambling bank are then given by (31) and (32), respectively.
Comparing these to τ
2 −D and τ
2 +ηA+(F − f)(1− p)−k(1 − p)−pD under a symmet-
ric choice, we can support an asymmetric outcome if e η
0
A ≤ ηA ≤ e η
00
A, where we use that
e η
00
A > e η
0
A. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. From the respective ﬁrst-order conditions we obtain the fol-
lowing results.30 If banks have already initially a diﬀerent risk proﬁle, as expressed by
the probabilities 1 − si with which they will have to recall a loan in t =2even without
strategy A, then their expected proﬁts from the loan market are given by
πi =
1
2τ
µ
τ +
y(pisi − pjsj)(q − β)
3
¶2
− S (1 − si). (33)
Note next that we stipulate without loss of generality that s1 >s 2. Suppose now that
one bank is anticipated to undertake activity A.I f t h e o t h e r b a n k , s a y n o w i =1 ,a l s o
undertakes activity A, then from (33) the respective proﬁts equal
ηA +
1
2τ
µ
τ +
yp(s1 − s2)(q − β)
3
¶2
− S (1 − s1),
while if bank i =1stays prudent proﬁts are
1
2τ
µ
τ +
y(s1 − ps2)(q − β)
3
¶2
− S (1 − s1).
Comparing these two proﬁts, we have that if bank i =1expects its rival to undertake A,
then it prefers to do so as well if
ηA ≥ η
00
A1 :=
1
6τ
y(q − β)s1(1 − p)
µ
y(q − β)
3
(s1(1 + p) − 2ps2)+2 τ
¶
.
Proceeding likewise for bank i =2 , we obtain the threshold
ηA ≥ η
00
A2 :=
1
6τ
y(q − β)s2(1 − p)
µ
y(q − β)
3
(s2(1 + p) − 2ps1)+2 τ
¶
.
Note that when subtracting η00
A2 from η00
A1,w eo b t a i n
1
3
y(q − β)(s1 − s2)(1 − p) > 0.
30Again, to obtain in equilibrium an interior solution 0 < ˆ x<1 it must hold that
|y(β − q)(p2s2 − p1s1)| < 3τ, which in turn is always satisﬁed as long as y(q − β)(s1 − ps2) < 3τ.
28Suppose next that a bank’s rival is anticipated not to undertake activity A. If the other
bank, say again ﬁrst i =1 , now undertakes activity A alone, then from (33) the respective
proﬁts equal
ηA +
1
2τ
µ
τ +
y(ps1 − s2)(q − β)
3
¶2
− S (1 − s1),
while if bank i =1also stays prudent proﬁts are
1
2τ
µ
τ +
y(s1 − s2)(q − β)
3
¶2
− S (1 − s1).
C o m p a r i n gt h e s et w op r o ﬁt s ,w eh a v et h a tb a n ki =1prefers to also undertake A if
ηA ≥ η
0
A1 :=
1
6τ
y(q − β)s1(1 − p)
µ
y(q − β)
3
(s1(1 + p) − 2s2)+2 τ
¶
,
which satisﬁes η0
A1 <η 00
A1. Proceeding likewise for bank i =2 , we obtain the threshold
ηA ≥ η
0
A2 :=
1
6τ
y(q − β)s2(1 − p)
µ
y(q − β)
3
(s2(1 + p) − 2s1)+2 τ
¶
.
Note again that when subtracting η0
A2 from η0
A1, we obtain
1
3
y(q − β)(s1 − s2)(1 − p) > 0.
Note ﬁnally that η0
A1 >η 00
A2 holds in case
s1 − s2 >
3s1s2(1 − p)
y(q − β)τ
.
The characterization of the diﬀerent equilibria for cases i) and ii) follows then immediately
from the construction of the diﬀerent thresholds. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .It is convenient to deﬁne for this proof B := (1 − p)y(q − β).
The threshold (17) then becomes, after substitution from (16),
η
0
Eff =
1
2
B
µ
1 −
1
3τ
B
¶
,
while we can use from (11) that
η
0
A :=
1
2
"
τ −
1
τ
µ
τ −
B
3
¶2#
.
That η0
Eff >η 0
A follows then if
B
µ
1 −
1
3τ
B
¶
>τ−
1
τ
µ
τ −
B
3
¶2
,
29which ﬁnally transforms to B<3τ/2. (Note that this is not implied by (6), which only
requires that B<3τ.)
We next take also into account the “shoe leather” costs of the borrower:
E(xτ)=C := τ
µZ e x
0
xdx +
Z 1−e x
0
xdx
¶
= τ
∙
1
2
− b x(1 − b x)
¸
.
We have C = τ/4 in a symmetric equilibrium. Given b x = 1
2 − 1
6τB for an asymmetric
equilibrium, the respective costs become
C = τ
1
4
µ
1+
B2
9τ2
¶
. (34)
The adjusted eﬃciency threshold then becomes
e η
0
Eff :=
1
2
B
µ
1 −
1
3τ
B
¶
+ τ
1
4
µ
1+
B2
9τ2
¶
,
such that e η
0
Eff >η 0
A holds only if
τ>
µ
B
3τ
¶
(B − 2τ). (35)
N o t en o wt h a tw eh a v ef r o m( 6 )t h a tτ>B / 3, implying that (35) always holds if B−2τ<
τ, which once again becomes τ>B / 3.
To compare η00
Eff = B(1 − b x) with η00
A,n o t et h a tη00
Eff >η 00
A holds if
B
µ
1+
1
3τ
B
¶
>
1
τ
µ
τ +
B
3
¶2
− τ,
which after some transformations indeed always holds. Using next C from (34) for the
asymmetric case, we obtain a new threshold
e η
00
Eff :=
1
2
B
µ
1+
1
3τ
B
¶
− τ
1
4
µ
1+
B2
9τ2
¶
,
for which e η
00
Eff >η 00
A holds if
τ<
B
3τ
(2τ + B). (36)
Note that this is compatible with τ>B / 3 from (6). Substituting τ = B/3, the condition
is satisﬁed up to some threshold for τ, from which on the converse of (6) holds strictly. ¥
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